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sets of admissible prices. This makes it possible to address coordination failures for cases
with price indexation or more general price linkages between commodities. We introduce
a new equilibrium concept, called quantity constrained equilibrium (QCE), giving a uni-
ﬁed treatment to all cases considered in the literature so far. At a QCE the expected trade
opportunities on supply and demand are completely determined by a rationing vector sat-
isfying that the prevailing price system maximizes the value of the rationing vector within
the set of admissible prices. When the set of admissible prices is compact, we show the
existence of a connected set of QCEs. This set connects two trivial no-trade equilibria, one
with completely pessimistic expectations concerning supply opportunities and one with
completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities. Moreover, the set
contains for every commodity a generalized Drèze equilibrium, being a QCE at which for
that commodity no binding trade opportunities on both supply and demand are expected,
and also a generalized supply-constrained equilibrium at which no binding constraints on
demand opportunities are expected and for at least one commodity also not on supply. We
apply this main result to several special cases, and also discuss the case of an unbounded
set of admissible prices.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by the renewed interest in equilibria with coordination failures. This interest can be traced back
to the work of Roberts (1987a,b, 1989a,b). These papers establish the existence of a continuum of equilibria with quantity
rationing of supply at competitive prices in a class of economies characterized by homothetic preferences and constant
returns to scale. The important point made in these papers is that rationing is not due to price distortions, but rather to
pessimistic expectations concerning trade opportunities. Even at competitive prices, there is a continuum of equilibria with
rationing. Rationing is therefore not due to wrong relative prices of commodities but is caused by coordination failures.
Several authors contributed further to the coordination failure literature by generalizing the work of Roberts in a number
of directions. Herings (1996a,b, 1998) extends Roberts’ results to an exchange economy with standard assumptions on the
primitives and allows for non-competitive prices. The set of admissible prices is obtained by specifying, for each commodity,
a lower bound and an upper bound on its price. Drèze (1997) and Citanna et al. (2001) treat the combination of ﬁxed and
ﬂexible prices and consider the framework of an economy with production. Drèze (2001) focuses on explaining downward
real price rigidities and understanding the nature and the sources of the coordination failures. His arguments are based on
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the combination of uncertainty and incomplete markets. When markets are incomplete, price regulations may be used to
generate Pareto improvements as stressed also by Drèze and Gollier (1993) and Herings and Polemarchakis (2005).
In this paper we extend the results on equilibria with coordination failures to a setting where the set of admissible prices
is not given by a simple combination of ﬁxed and ﬂexible prices or by a simple speciﬁcation of a lower and an upper bound on
the prices of all commodities. We are interested in sets of admissible prices that may reﬂect any kind of price indexation or
pricelinkages.Specialcasesofsuchsetsofadmissiblepriceshavebeenstudiedbeforeintheﬁx-priceliteraturebyChettyand
Nayak (1978), Kurz (1982), Dehez and Drèze (1984), van der Laan (1984) and Weddepohl (1987). To deal with general cases
of price restrictions, we allow for an arbitrary convex set of prices and deﬁne a unifying equilibrium concept, called quantity
constrained equilibrium (QCE). Whereas the literature of the previous paragraph takes an ad hoc approach in deﬁning an
equilibriumappropriateforthesetofadmissiblepricesstudied,wepindownacommonprinciplebehindallthesedeﬁnitions.
This common principle is that pessimistic expectations concerning supply or demand opportunities may only emerge at a
certain price system, if that price system maximizes the value of the rationing vector within the set of admissible prices.
An immediate implication of this principle is that pessimistic expectations concerning supply or demand opportunities of a
commodity are excluded when the price of that commodity is ﬂexible and that pessimistic expectations concerning supply
(demand) possibilities of a commodity may only occur when there is a downwards (upwards) price rigidity.
We show that in case the set of admissible prices is compact and only contains positive price vectors, there exists a
continuum of quantity constrained equilibria connecting two trivial equilibria. One trivial QCE is a fully supply-constrained
no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning supply opportunities for all commodities and
prices such that the value of the total initial endowments is minimized within the set of admissible prices. The other trivial
QCEisatrivialfullydemand-constrainedno-tradeequilibriumwithcompletelypessimisticexpectationsconcerningdemand
opportunities for all commodities and prices such that the value of the total initial endowments is maximized.
The connected set of non-trivial QCEs contains for every commodity a generalized Drèze equilibrium, being a QCE at
which for that commodity no binding constraints on supply and on demand are expected, a generalized supply-constrained
equilibrium, at which no binding constraints on demand are expected and for at least one commodity also not on supply,
and a generalized demand-constrained equilibrium, at which no binding constraints on supply are expected and for at least
one commodity also not on demand.
In Section 5 we consider some applications and extensions. First we consider the case of price indexation and show that
our main theorem extends to the results that were obtained in the literature for special cases of price indexation. Second,
we consider cases in which the set of admissible prices is unbounded, allowing for models in which some prices are fully
ﬂexible, some prices are bounded, and other prices are linked. In case the set of prices is unbounded, the connected set
of QCEs is also unbounded with some of the prices going to inﬁnity, while simultaneously for any commodity with price
boundedfromabove,itsrelativepricetendstozeroandeventuallyallconsumerswillhavecompletepessimisticexpectations
concerning demand opportunities of such a commodity, implying no-trade for this commodity. In the limit the economy
reduces to an economy where trade only takes place in the commodities for which the prices are unbounded from above.
Whenthepricesofthesecommoditiesarenottiedtopricesofothercommodities,thesepricestendtoWalrasianequilibrium
values for this reduced economy. In case this holds for all commodities, there is a connected set of QCEs leading from a fully
supply-constrained no-trade equilibrium to a Walrasian equilibrium. Since all consumers keep their initial endowments at
a fully supply-constrained equilibrium and the Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto efﬁcient, this case is most striking as far as
the potential detrimental effects of coordination failures are concerned.
Thepaperhasbeenorganizedasfollows.Section2describesthemodelanddiscussesequilibriawithcoordinationfailures
in case the prices are ﬁxed or restricted by a lower and an upper bound. Section 3 introduces the general concept of quantity
constrainedequilibrium.Forthecompact,convexcasewithpositivepricestheexistenceresultisgiveninSection4.InSection
5 we consider the application of general price indexation and the extension to unbounded admissible sets of prices.
2. Preliminaries
We consider an exchange economy E = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,P). In this economy there are m consumers, indexed i = 1,...,m,
and n commodities, indexed j = 1,...,n.F o rk a positive integer, we denote Ik ={ 1,...,k}. Each consumer i∈Im is character-
ized by a consumption set Xi, a preference preordering i on Xi, and a vector of initial endowments wi. The total endowment
w is deﬁned by w =
 
i∈Imwi. We assume that the admissible price systems in the economy E are described by a set P ⊂ Rn
+.
We make the following standard assumptions.
Assumption X. For every consumer i∈Im, the consumption set Xi is a closed and convex subset of Rn
+ and Xi + Rn
+ ⊂ Xi.
Assumption U. For every consumer i∈Im, the preference preordering i on Xi is complete, continuous, strongly monotonic,
and strictly convex.1
Assumption W. For every consumer i∈Im, the vector of initial endowments wi belongs to the interior of Xi.
1 A preference preordering i is said to be strongly monotonic if ¯ xi, ˆ xi ∈Xi, ¯ xi ≤ ˆ xi, and ¯ xi / = ˆ xi implies ˆ xi i¯ xi. A preference preordering i is said to be
strictly convex when for any pair ¯ xi, ˆ xi ∈Xi, such that ¯ xi / = ˆ xi, ¯ xi∼iˆ xi, it holds that  ¯ xi + (1 −  )ˆ xi i¯ xi for  ∈(0,1).P.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37 25
It should be noticed that all results carry over to the case of convex preferences. Assuming strict convexity allows us
to work with demand functions instead of demand correspondences and thus simpliﬁes notation. Also the assumption of
strongly monotonic preferences is made for the sake of simplicity and can be relaxed considerably.
When trade takes place at some p∈P this does not necessarily imply that p is a competitive equilibrium price system.
Thereforetheremightbemarketsinexcessdemandorexcesssupply.Inbothcases,adistributionalruleisneededtodetermine
the allocation that results. Such a distributional rule is called a rationing system. For example, some households could
expect to be rationed on their net demand or net supply. Although we restrict our attention to uniform rationing, i.e. all
households that experience supply (demand) rationing in a certain market, will end up with the same net supply (demand)
of the commodity concerned, our results carry over to a variety of other rationing systems (see Herings, 1996a for a general
treatment of rationing systems). In a uniform rationing system, the expectations of available supply opportunities for a
householdonthevariousmarketsaredescribedbyavector ∈−Rn
+,andtheexpectationsofavailabledemandopportunities
by a vector u∈Rn
+. In equilibrium, the expected trade opportunities are required to be rational and thus match the amounts
allocated by the rationing system.
Given a price system p∈P and expected trade opportunities   for supply and u for demand, the constrained budget set of
consumer i∈Im is given by
Bi(p, ,u) ={ xi ∈Xi|p · xi ≤ p · wi and  k ≤ xi
k − wi
k ≤ uk, ∀k∈In}
and the constrained demand di(p, ,u)o fi is the best element for i in Bi(p, ,u). Because of strict convexity and strong
monotonicity, this element is unique and lies on the budget hyperplane, i.e. p · di(p, ,u) = p · wi.
A well-known particular set P of admissible prices is that P is a cube
Cn ={ p∈Rn
+|p
k ≤ pk ≤ ¯ pk,k∈In},
where p
k and ¯ pk are a priorily given lower and upper bounds for the price pk of good k∈In satisfying 0 <p
k ≤ ¯ pk. For such a
set of admissible prices a constrained equilibrium is deﬁned as follows (Drèze, 1975).
Deﬁnition 2.1. A constrained equilibrium for the economy E = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,Cn) is a price system p∗ ∈Cn, expected trade
opportunities ( ∗,u ∗)∈−Rn
+ × Rn
+, and, for every consumer i∈Im, a consumption bundle x∗i ∈Xi such that




(iii) for all k∈In: x∗h
k − wh
k =  ∗
k for some h∈Im implies x∗i
k − wi
k <u ∗
k,∀i∈Im, and, analogously, x∗h
k − wh
k = u∗
k for some h∈Im
implies x∗i
k − wi
k >  ∗
k,∀i∈Im;









k = ¯ pk.
Condition (i) requires that the consumption of each consumer equals his constrained demand, while Condition (ii) is
the market clearing condition. Condition (iii) says that markets are frictionless, i.e. there can not be (binding) pessimistic
expectations simultaneously on both sides of a market. Condition (iv) precludes pessimistic expectations concerning supply
(demand respectively) opportunities in the market of some commodity as long as its price is not on its lower (upper)
bound. Herings (1998) has shown that there exists a connected set of (non-trivial) constrained equilibria that connects
two trivial equilibria. Both trivial equilbria are extreme cases of coordination failure. One is the fully supply-constrained
equilibriumgivenby ∗ = 0n,p ∗ = pandx∗i = wi,i∈Im,i.e.eachconsumerhascompletelypessimisticexpectationsabouthis
supplyopportunities.Theotheristhefullydemand-constrainedequilibriumwithcompletelypessimisticexpectationsabout
demands, given by u∗ = 0n,p ∗ = ¯ p and x∗i = wi,i∈Im. Because of the completely pessimistic expectations, in the fully supply-
constrained (demand-constrained, respectively) equilibrium no consumer expresses any demand (supply) and therefore
the completely pessimistic expectations are conﬁrmed. The continuum result of Herings (1998) admits very simple proofs
of a number of special cases, like the existence of a Drèze equilibrium with respect to any a priorily chosen commodity
(Drèze, 1975) and the existence of a supply-constrained equilibrium (van der Laan, 1980, 1982). A Drèze equilibrium with
respect to commodity k is a constrained equilibrium without rationing in the market for commodity k. A supply-constrained
equilibrium is a constrained equilibrium without rationing on any demand and without rationing on the market of at least
one commodity. An algorithm to compute the connected set of constrained equilibria has been proposed in Herings et al.
(1996). For results on the set of equilibria when p
k = ¯ pk for all k∈In and thus the set P = Cn reduces to a single element, we
refer to for instance Herings (1998) or Citanna et al. (2001).
3. Quantity constrained equilibria
An equilibrium concept for a general set P of price restrictions should contain the concept of Deﬁnition 3.1 as a special
case when P = Cn. The utility maximizing Condition (i) and the market clearing Condition (ii) of Deﬁnition 2.1 carry over
easily to the general case. Also Condition (iii) that markets are frictionless is not difﬁcult to implement. Difﬁculties only arise
in generalizing Condition (iv). This condition says that pessimistic expectations are only allowed when the price mechanism
of falling prices in case of excess supply and rising prices in case of excess demand is not able to operate because of the lower26 P.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37
and upper bounds. To generalize this condition to general sets P we will allow that pessimistic expected trade opportunities
take over and may constrain individual excess demand or supply accordingly, when prices can not be adjusted in such a way
that the unconstrained excess demands and supplies are expected to decrease in absolute value. To make this more precise,
we ﬁrst reformulate Deﬁnition 2.1.
Itshouldbenoticedthatdifferentexpectedsupplyanddemandopportunitiesmayyieldthesameconstrainedequilibrium
allocation. When expectations concerning supply (demand respectively) opportunities are not binding, the precise speciﬁ-
cation of the expected supply opportunity  ∗
k (demand opportunity u∗







for all i∈Im. This freedom in the speciﬁcation of non-binding opportunities can be used to simplify the equilibrium deﬁnition
by making a particular choice. In the sequel we focus on expected trade opportunities (l,u) that are represented by a single
vector r ∈[−w,w], called the rationing vector, where [−w,w] ={ x∈Rn|−w ≤ x ≤ w}. A rationing vector r ∈[−w,w] induces
expected trade opportunities ( ,u)g i v e nb y
  =− w − r ≤ 0n and u = w − r ≥ 0n.
Making use of r gives the following redeﬁnition of constrained equilibrium on Cn.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A constrained equilibrium for the economy E = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,Cn) is a price system p∗ ∈Cn, a rationing
vector r∗ ∈[−w,w], and, for every consumer i∈Im, a consumption bundle x∗i ∈Xi such that














k = ¯ pk.
Since 0n ≤ x∗i ≤ w and 0n   wi   w and therefore −w   x∗i − wi   w for any i, a negative value of r∗
k implies that only
expected trade opportunities concerning the supply of commodity k can be binding, in which case pk is on its lower bound,
while the opposite holds in case of a positive value of r∗
k. When r∗
k = 0, then expected trade opportunities on neither the
demand side nor the supply side of the market for commodity k can be binding. Therefore Condition (iii) replaces both
Condition (iii) and Condition (iv) of Deﬁnition 2.1.
A constrained equilibrium according to Deﬁnition 3.1 has the property that the equilibrium rationing vector r∗ satisﬁes
p∗ · r∗ = max{p · r∗|p∈Cn}, i.e. r∗ points outwards to Cn at the equilibrium price vector p∗. We use this property to generalize
Deﬁnition 3.1 to general price sets P. Formally, we require that at a constrained equilibrium the rationing vector r ∈[−w,w]
is such that p · r = max{ˆ p · r|ˆ p∈P} and thus points outwards to P at p. In the sequel a pair (p,r) satisfying this property will
be called stable. A stable equilibrium pair (p∗,r∗) implies that rationing is not binding when p∗ lies in the interior of the set
P, because then stability implies that r∗ = 0n. Indeed, when p∗ lies in the interior of P, prices are fully ﬂexible and can be
adjusted according to the law of supply and demand and therefore excess demand or excess supply need not be constrained
by rationing. If p∗ does not lie in the interior of the set P, then the stability property implies that the rationing vector r∗
points outwards to P at p∗, being a direction into which the price vector cannot be further adjusted. The collection of all these
directions is called the normal cone at p∗ to P. More formally, for p∈P, the normal cone G(p)t oP at p is given by
G(p) ={ y∈Rn|ˆ p · y ≤ p · y for any ˆ p∈P}
and determines precisely the rationing vectors that may occur at p. The stability concept is therefore equivalent to the
requirement that r ∈G(p). This gives us the following deﬁnition of the general concept of a quantity constrained equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 3.2. (quantity constrained equilibrium) A quantity constrained equilibrium for the economy E =
({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,P) is a price system p∗ ∈P, a rationing vector r∗ ∈[−w,w], and, for every consumer i∈Im, a consumption
bundle x∗i ∈Xi satisfying






by a vector r∗ in the normal cone G(p∗) to the set of admissible prices P at the equilibrium price system p∗. In case that P
equals Cn, consider a pair (p∗,r∗) with r∗
k positive. Then such a pair can only be stable when p∗
k = ¯ pk. Similarly, when r∗
k
is negative, the pair can only be stable when p∗
k = p
k. Therefore, in this case the requirement that (p∗,r∗) be stable yields
precisely Condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 3.1.
In general, since 0n ≤ x∗i ≤ w and 0n   wi   w, in a QCE it holds that −wk <x ∗i
k − wi
k <w k for all k∈In and i∈Im. Hence,
in a QCE, a consumer i∈Im can only face binding expected demand opportunities for good k if r∗
k = wk − (x∗i
k − wi
k) > 0.
Analogously, some consumer i∈Im can only face binding expected supply opportunities for good k if r∗
k =− wk − (x∗i
k − wi
k) <
0. Notice that the more the expectations concerning supply (demand) opportunities of commodity k are pessimistic, theP.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37 27
closer its rationing level r∗
k is to −wk (to wk). In particular, expectations concerning supply opportunities of commodity k
are completely pessimistic if r∗
k =− wk and expectations concerning demand opportunities of commodity k are completely
pessimistic if r∗
k = wk. When p∗ is in the interior of P, then r∗ = 0n, in which case the expected demand opportunities equal
w and the expected supply opportunities equal −w, implying that in equilibrium the expected trade opportunities are not
binding and thus p∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector. Summarizing, in a QCE consumers maximize their utility in their
constrained budget sets, total demand equals total supply, there are no binding expected trade opportunities on both supply
and demand simultaneously, and the rationing vector points into a direction such that the value of the rationing vector can
not be increased by moving the price vector within P.
From an economic point of view, it is of crucial importance that the equilibrium concept is independent of the units of
measurement that are used in the deﬁnition of a commodity. Suppose that the unit of measurement used in the deﬁnition
of commodity k is multiplied by a positive constant ˛k,k= 1,...,n.L e t˛ = (˛1,...,˛ n). An economy E(˛) with initial
endowments wi(˛)g i v e nb ywi
k(˛) = wk/˛k,k = 1,...,n, set of admissible prices
P(˛) ={ˆ p∈Rn|ˆ pk = ˛kpk,k = 1,...,n,for somep∈P}
and appropriately redeﬁned consumption sets Xi(˛) and preference relations i(˛) should have an equivalent set of QCEs as
the economy E. More precisely, for each QCE (p∗,r∗,x ∗)o fE there should be a QCE (p∗(˛),r∗(˛),x ∗(˛)) of E(˛) and vice versa,
where p∗(˛) is obtained from p∗ by componentwise multiplication by ˛, and r∗(˛) and x∗(˛) are obtained from r∗ and x∗ by
componentwise division by ˛. The following result claims that equivalence indeed holds.
Theorem3.3. Foranychoiceof˛   0,itholdsthat(p∗,r∗,x ∗)isaQCEofE = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,P)ifandonlyif(p∗(˛),r∗(˛),x ∗(˛))
is a QCE of E(˛) = ({Xi(˛),i(˛),wi(˛)}
m
i=1,P(˛)).
Proof. It is obvious that (p∗,r∗,x ∗) satisﬁes Conditions (i) and (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.2 of a QCE of E if and only if
(p∗(˛),r∗(˛),x ∗(˛)) satisﬁes Conditions (i) and (ii) of Deﬁnition 3.2 of a QCE of E(˛). It is easily veriﬁed that r∗ ∈G(p∗)i f
and only if r∗(˛)∈G˛(p∗(˛)), where G˛(p∗(˛)) denotes the normal cone to P(˛)a tp∗(˛). This shows that (p∗,r∗,x ∗) satisﬁes
Condition (iii) of the deﬁnition of a QCE of E if and only if (p∗(˛),r∗(˛),x ∗(˛)) satisﬁes Condition (iii) of the deﬁnition of a
QCE of E(˛). 
4. Existence results
In this section we consider the case that P is a compact, convex set containing only positive prices. In the next section we
also allow for an unbounded set of admissible prices.
Assumption P. The set P of admissible prices is a non-empty, convex, and compact subset in the interior of Rn
+.
We ﬁrst show that there are two different trivial no-trade QCEs, one with completely pessimistic expectations con-
cerning supply opportunities, implied by r∗ =− w, and one with completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand
opportunities, implied by r∗ = w.L e tP0 and P1 be given by
P0 ={ p∈P|w · p ≤ w · ˜ p for all ˜ p ∈P}
and
P1 ={ p∈P|w · p ≥ w · ˜ p for all ˜ p∈P}.
Under Assumption P, both P0 and P1 are non-empty, convex and compact and their intersection is either empty or equal
to P. Prices in P0 are such that the value of the total initial endowment p · w is minimized, and prices in P1 are such that
this value is maximized. The next result claims that there is a trivial no-trade QCE with completely pessimistic expectations
concerning supply opportunities at any price in P0 and a trivial no-trade QCE with completely pessimistic expectations
concerning demand opportunities at any price in P1.
Theorem 4.1. For any p∈P0 there is a fully supply-constrained equilibrium with rationing vector r∗ =− w and allocation x∗i =
wi,i∈Im.Foranyp∈P1 thereisafullydemand-constrainedequilibriumwithrationingvectorr∗ = wandallocationx∗i = wi,i∈Im.
Proof. Take any p∈P0. By deﬁnition of P0 we have that −w∈G(p). Taking r =− w gives for any i∈Im that Bi(p,0n,2w) ={ wi}
and hence di(p,0n,2w) = wi, implying that markets clear and thus a no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic
expectations concerning supply opportunities is obtained.
Analogously,takeanyp∈P1.Itholdsthatw∈G(p).Takingr = w,wehaveforan yi∈Im thatBi(p,−2w,0n) ={ xi ∈Xi|xi ≤ wi}
and hence by Assumption U that di(p,−2w,0n) = wi, implying that markets clear and thus a no-trade equilibrium with
completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities is obtained. 
If at a QCE it holds that r∗ =− w or r∗ = w, we say that the QCE is trivial. Otherwise, we call the QCE non-trivial. The
existenceofacontinuumofnon-trivialQCEsfollowsfromthenextresult,whichsaysthatthereexistsaconnectedsetofQCEs
containing both a trivial no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning supply opportunities
and a trivial no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities.28 P.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37
Theorem 4.2. Let E = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U, W and P. Then there exists a connected
set D of quantity constrained equilibria of the economy E, containing a fully supply-constrained equilibrium (p0,−w,w1,...,wm)
for some p0 ∈P0, and a fully demand-constrained equilibrium (p1,w,w1,...,wm) for some p1 ∈P1.
Since the rationing vector is equal to −w at a fully supply-constrained equilibrium and equal to w at a fully demand-
constrained equilibrium, the connected set D contains a continuum of non-trivial QCEs.
We continue this section with the proof of Theorem 4.2 and conclude the section with a discussion of the implications
of the result. We ﬁrst focus on the equilibrating mechanism to ﬁnd a QCE. To do so, we introduce a set Q ⊂ Rn containing P
and deﬁne for every q∈Q an admissible price vector p(q)∈P and a rationing vector r(q)∈[−w,w]. The set Q i st a k e nt ob e
Q ={ q∈Rn| q − p 2 ≤ 1 for somep∈P},
so Q is the set of elements in Rn lying at most at a distance 1 from P, using the Euclidean norm, and thus includes the set P.I n
the sequel bnd(Q) denotes the boundary of Q and int(Q) its interior. For any q∈Q, we deﬁne the corresponding price vector
p(q) to be the projection of q on P, i.e.
p(q) = argmin
p∈P
 p − q 2.
Since by Assumption P, the set P is convex and compact, for every q∈Q it holds that p(q) is uniquely deﬁned and is
continuous in q, and q − p(q)∈G(p(q)). Moreover,  q − p(q) 2 ≤ 1, with equality if and only if q∈bnd(Q). It also holds that
p(q) = q if and only if q∈P. The set Q has the following properties.
Lemma 4.3.
(i) The set Q is a convex, compact, full-dimensional subset of Rn and contains P in its interior;
(ii) The boundary of Q is smooth.
Proof. The compactness follows from the compactness of P. That Q is full-dimensional and contains P in its interior fol-
lows immediately from its deﬁnition. To prove convexity, take any q1,q 2 ∈Q and 0 ≤   ≤ 1, and let q( ) =  q1 + (1 −  )q2
and p( ) =  p(q1) + (1 −  )p(q2). Since P is convex, we know that p( )∈P. Moreover,  q( ) − p( ) 2 ≤   q1 − p(q1) 2 + (1 −
 ) q2 − p(q2) 2 ≤ 1. Therefore, q( )∈Q.
Property (ii) follows from the use of the 2-norm in the deﬁnition of Q.T a k ea n yq∗ ∈bnd(Q). Then  q∗ − p(q∗) 2 = 1 and
any q with  q − p(q∗) 2 ≤ 1 belongs to Q. Hence, the normal cone at q∗ contains at most one vector with length one. Since
Q is convex, we know that the normal cone at q∗ is non-empty and upper-semi-continuous. Hence, the normal cone at any
boundary point q of Q contains a unique vector with length one and this vector is continuous in q, i.e. the boundary of Q is
smooth. 
We deﬁne the rationing vector r(q) corresponding to q by the function r : Q → Rn, where






 q − p(q) 2(q − p(q)),q ∈Q \ P.








(qk − pk(q)) ≤ wk,
it follows that r(q) goes to 0n when q converges to a point in P. This implies that r(q) is continuous in q. The other properties
below immediately follow from the deﬁnition of the function r.
Corollary 4.4. The function r : Q → Rn satisﬁes the following properties:
(i) r is continuous;
(ii) r(q)∈[−w,w] for all q∈Q;
(iii) rk(q) = wk if and only if wk/(qk − pk(q)) = minj∈Inwj/(|qj − pj(q)|) and q∈bnd(Q);
(iv) rk(q) =− wk if and only if −wk/(qk − pk(q)) = minj∈Inwj/(|qj − pj(q)|) and q∈bnd(Q);
(v) r(q)∈G(p(q)) for all q∈Q.
We now deﬁne for any consumer i∈Im the reduced budget correspondence Bi : Q → Rn by
Bi(q) = Bi(p(q),−w − r(q),w− r(q)),q ∈Q.P.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37 29
Finally,foranyconsumeri∈Im wedeﬁnethereduceddemandfunctiondi : Q → Rn bydi(q) = di(p(q),−w − r(q),w− r(q)).
Because the set P is in the interior of Rn
+, we have that for any q∈Q the price vector p(q)∈P is strictly positive. Notice that
since −w − r(q) can be equal to zero, the cheaper point assumption that is usually required to show continuity of the budget
correspondence, is violated. Nevertheless, it follows from Theorem 2.2 in Herings (1996b) that Bi is continuous at any q∈Q.






By Assumption U the budget constraint p(q) · di(q) ≤ p(q) · wi is always satisﬁed with equality and hence Walras’ law
holds, i.e. p(q) · z(q) = 0 for all q∈Q. The function z satisﬁes the following properties.
Lemma 4.5. Under Assumptions X, U, W and P, the reduced excess demand function z : Q → Rn satisﬁes the following:
(i) z is continuous;
(ii) Walras’ law holds: p(q) · z(q) = 0 for all q∈Q;
(iii) rk(q) =− wk implies zk(q) ≥ 0 and rk(q) = wk implies zk(q) ≤ 0.
The next lemma shows that a zero point of z on Q induces a QCE.
Lemma 4.6. Let q∗ be a zero point of z on Q, i.e. z(q∗) = 0n. Then (p(q∗),r(q∗),d 1(q∗),...,d m(q∗)) is a quantity constrained
equilibrium.
Proof. We have to show that Conditions (i)–(iii) of Deﬁnition 3.2 hold. Clearly, p(q∗)∈P,r(q∗)∈[−w,w], and Conditions (i)
and (ii) hold by construction of the reduced excess demand function. By Property (v) of Corollary 4.4 we have that r(q∗)i s
an element of G(p(q∗)), which shows that Condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 3.2 holds. 
From Lemma 4.6 it follows that the questin of existence of a QCE reduces to the existence of a zero point of z. Before
stating our general result on the connected set of equilibria in terms of the parameter q, we ﬁrst show that there are two
differentkindsoftrivialzeropointsofz,onecorrespondingtoatrivialno-tradeQCEwithcompletelypessimisticexpectations
concerning supply opportunities and one with completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities. Let
Q0 and Q1 be given by
Q0 ={ q∈Q|w · q ≤ w · ˜ q for all ˜ q∈Q},
and
Q1 ={ q∈Q|w · q ≥ w · ˜ q for all ˜ q∈Q}.
Clearly, since Q is compact, the sets Q0 and Q1 are both non-empty. Moreover, the intersection of Q0 and Q1 is empty,
since Q is full-dimensional.
Lemma 4.7. Each element in Q0 or Q1 is a zero point of z and yields a trivial no-trade quantity constrained equilibrium:
(i) Any q∈Q0 induces the fully supply-constrained QCE (p(q),−w,w1,...,wm) with p(q)∈P0.
(ii) Any q∈Q1 induces the fully demand-constrained QCE (p(q),w,w1,...,wm) with p(q)∈P1.
Proof. Take any q∈Q0. Clearly, q∈bnd(Q). By deﬁnition of Q0 we have that r(q) =− w and p(q)∈P0. It follows that, for any
i∈Im,Bi(q) ={ wi} and hence di(q) = wi, implying that z(q) = 0n and thus q induces a no-trade equilibrium with completely
pessimistic expected supply opportunities.
Analogously,takeanyq∈Q1.Thenr(q) = w andp(q)∈P1.Itfollowsthat,foranyi∈Im,Bi(q) ={ xi ∈Xi|xi ≤ wi}andhenceby
Assumption U that di(q) = wi, implying that z(q) = 0n and thus q induces a no-trade equilibrium with completely pessimistic
expected demand opportunities. 
From this lemma it follows immediately that all trivial QCEs are induced by Q0 and Q1 and that every zero point of z not
in Q0 or Q1 induces a non-trivial QCE. Theorem 4.2 now follows from the next result saying that Q contains a connected set
C of zero points of z having a non-empty intersection with both Q0 and Q1.
Theorem 4.8. Let E = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U, W and P. Then there exists a connected
set C ⊂ Q of zero points of z such that C ∩ Q0 / =∅and C ∩ Q1 / =∅ .30 P.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37
Proof. Let  0 and  1 be such that
 n
k=1wkqk =  0 when q∈Q0 and
 n
k=1wkqk =  1 when q∈Q1. Notice that  0 and  1 are
well-deﬁned,  1 >  0 and  0 ≤
 n




wkxk =  0,maxk∈Inxk ≤ M}
and, for 0 <˛≤ 1,X˛ ⊂ Rn by






( 1 −  0)w,x0 ∈X0}.
Clearly, for x∈X˛,0 ≤ ˛ ≤ 1, we have that
 n
k=1wkxk = (1 − ˛) 0 + ˛ 1, and thus
 n
k=1wkxk =  0 when x∈X0 and  n
k=1wkxk =  1 when x∈X1. Further, deﬁne
X =∪ ˛∈[0,1]X˛
and take M sufﬁciently large that Q ⊂ X and that any q∈Q \ (Q0 ∪ Q1) lies in the interior of X. Notice that Q0 = Q ∩ X0 and
Q1 = Q ∩ X1.
We deﬁne the set ¯ X0 ={ x∈Rn|
 n
k=1wkxk =  0}.L e t (x) be the orthogonal projection of x∈Rn on ¯ X0, i.e.  (x) = x −  w
for some  ∈R. Next, let the set ˜ X0 be deﬁned by
˜ X0 ={ x∈ ¯ X0|x =  (q + z(q)),q∈Q}∪{ x∈ ¯ X0|x =  (p(q)),q∈bnd(Q)}.
Since Q is compact and z and   are continuous functions, it follows that ˜ X0 is a bounded subset of ¯ X0 and thus M can be
taken so large that X0 contains ˜ X0 in its relative interior.








{ (x˛ + z(x˛))} if x˛ ∈int(Q),
Conv({ (x˛ + z(x˛))}∪{  (p(x˛))})i fx˛ ∈bnd(Q),
{ (p(q(x˛)))} if x˛ ∈X \ Q,
for all (x,˛)∈X0 × [0,1], where Conv(·) denotes the convex hull of a set and q(x) is the orthogonal projection of x∈Rn on Q.
Clearly, X0 is compact and convex, the mapping ϕ is upper semi-continuous, and for every (x,˛)∈X0 × [0,1] it holds that
ϕ(x,˛) is compact, convex and non-empty. According to Browder’s theorem, see Browder (1960), there exists a connected
set ¯ C of ﬁxed points of ϕ in X0 × [0,1] such that ¯ C ∩ (X0 ×{ 0}) / =∅and ¯ C ∩ (X0 ×{ 1}) / =∅ , i.e. there exists a connected set ¯ C
in X0 × [0,1] satisfying
x∈ϕ(x,˛),for all (x,˛)∈ ¯ C,
containing both a point in X0 ×{ 0} and a point in X0 ×{ 1}. Hence, the set C ⊂ X deﬁned by
C ={¯ x∈X|¯ x = x˛,(x,˛)∈ ¯ C}
is a connected set in X such that C ∩ X0 / =∅and C ∩ X1 / =∅ . It remains to be shown that every element of C lies in Q and is a
zero point of z.
Take any ¯ x∈C, then ¯ x = x˛ for some (x,˛)∈ ¯ C. Suppose ﬁrst that x˛ ∈X \ Q. From the deﬁnition of ϕ it then follows that
x =  (p(q(x˛))).
Since  (¯ x) is the projection of ¯ x on X0, there exists  ∈R such that x =  (p(q(x˛))) = p(q(x˛)) −  w. Since x˛ − q(x˛) =
ˇ(q(x˛) − p(q(x˛))) for some ˇ ≥ 0, it follows that
(ˇ + 1)(q(x˛) − p(q(x˛))) = x˛ − p(q(x˛))





















This implies that q(x˛) − p(q(x˛)) = ıw for some ı∈R. Since q(x˛)∈bnd(Q), q(x˛) − p(q(x˛)) 2 = 1, so ı∈{− 1
 w 2 , 1
 w 2 },
which in turn implies that q(x˛)∈Q0 ∪ Q1, as only points ¯ q in Q0 ∪ Q1 satisfy that ¯ q − p(¯ q) is a strictly positive multiple ofP.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37 31
w. Suppose q(x˛)∈Q0.N o wx˛ ∈X˛ and q(x˛)∈Q0 implies x˛ = q(x˛), so x˛ ∈Q0. A similar argument shows that q(x˛)∈Q1
implies x˛ ∈Q1. In both case we obtain a contradiction to x˛ / ∈ Q. Consequently, x˛ ∈Q.
Next,supposethatx˛ ∈int(Q).Thenx˛ − ˛/
 n
k=1w2
k( 1 −  0)w = x =  (x˛ + z(x˛)).Since (x˛ + z(x˛)) = x˛ + z(x˛) −  w






















Because of Walras’ law, we obtain




















p(x˛) · w = 0.
Hence, since p(x˛) · w>0, we have that   = ˛/
 n
k=1w2
k( 1 −  0) and thus z(x˛) = 0n, showing that x˛ is a zero point of
z.
Finally, suppose x˛ ∈bnd(Q). Then there exists ˇ1 ≥ 0 and ˇ2 ≥ 0 with ˇ1 + ˇ2 = 1 such that






( 1 −  0)w.
Using that  (¯ x) is the projection of ¯ x on X0, it follows that this can be rewritten as






( 1 −  0)w,




( 1 −  0) we obtain
ˇ1z(x˛) = ˇ2(x˛ − p(x˛)) +  w.
First, suppose ˇ1 = 0. Then, as before, it follows that x˛ − p(x˛) = ıw for some ı∈{−1/ w 2,1/ w 2}, implying that


























































for all h∈In and therefore z(x˛) = 0n due to Walras’ law. 32 P.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37
The theorem says that there is a connected set C in Q of zero points of the reduced excess demand function z, containing at
least a trivial zero point q0 in Q0 and a trivial zero point q1 in Q1. Since Q0 and Q1 have an empty intersection, there must be
a connected set of non-trivial zero points between Q0 and Q1. According to Lemma 4.6 every non-trivial zero point q∗ ∈C of z
inducesanon-trivialquantityconstrainedequilibrium(p∗,r∗,x ∗) = (p(q∗),r(q∗),d(q∗)),whered(q∗) = (d1(q∗),...,d m(q∗))is
the demand allocation induced by q∗. In order to prove Theorem 4.2 we still have to show that the set {(p(q),r(q),d(q))|q∈C}
is a connected set.
Proof of Theorem 4.2. Take the function f : Q → P × Rn ×
 
i∈ImXi deﬁned by
f(q) = (p(q),r(q),d 1(q),...,d m(q)),q ∈Q.
Consider the connected set C of zero points of z as deﬁned in Theorem 4.8. It follows by Lemma 4.6 that every point in
C induces a QCE of E. Since f is a continuous function and by Theorem 4.8 C is connected, it follows that the set D ={ x|x =
f(q),q∈C} is connected. By Lemma 4.7, it follows that f(q) is a fully supply-constrained equilibrium whenever q∈Q0 and
f(q) is a fully demand-constrained equilibrium whenever q∈Q1. Since C intersects both Q0 and Q1, the set D contains both
a fully supply-constrained equilibrium and a fully demand-constrained equilibrium. 
We have proved now that there exists a connected set of non-trivial quantity constrained equilibria connecting a no-trade
equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning supply opportunities and a no-trade equilibrium with
completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities. Each quantity constrained equilibrium is induced
bysomeq∈Q.An yqinQ0 orinQ1 yieldsatrivialquantityconstrainedequilibrium,whereasanyq∗ inCnotinQ0 orQ1 yields
a non-trivial quantity constrained equilibrium. If q∗ ∈P, then p(q∗) = q∗ is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector, the rationing
vector r(q∗) = 0n, and the induced expected trade opportunities given by ( ∗,u ∗) = (−w,w) are not binding, i.e. no consumer
faces binding expected trade opportunities on either the demand side or the supply side and there is no coordination failure.
If q∗ is not in P and so p(q∗) / = q∗, then the price vector p∗ = p(q∗) lies on the boundary of the set P of admissible prices and
the rationing vector r∗ = r(q∗) lies in the normal cone G(p∗)a tp∗ to P, and so the prices cannot be adjusted further at p∗ in
the direction r∗. The vector r∗ then determines the expected trade opportunities ( ∗,u ∗) = (−w − r∗,w− r∗). Expected trade
opportunities on supply can only be binding for commodity k when r∗
k < 0 and expected opportunities on demand can only
be binding for commodity h when r∗
h > 0.
HavingprovedthatthereexistsaconnectedsetofQCEsconnectingatrivialfullysupply-constrainedno-tradeequilibrium
and a trivial fully demand-constrained no-trade equilibrium, it is easy to show that this set contains several non-trivial QCEs
with some speciﬁc properties. These properties are most easily stated in terms of the parametrization by the set Q, with each
q∈Q inducing a price p(q), a rationing vector r(q), and an allocation (d1(q),...,d m(q)).
First of all, recall that for any q0 ∈C ∩ Q0 it holds that r(q0) =− w and that for any q1 ∈C ∩ Q1 it holds that r(q1) = w.
Therefore, since C connects Q0 and Q1 and r is a continuous function on Q, for any a priori chosen k∈In there exists a q(k)∈C
satisfying rk(q(k)) = 0. Such a q(k) induces expected trade opportunities ( ,u) with  k =− wk and uk = wk. The point q(k)i n
Q therefore induces a QCE at which no consumer faces binding expected opportunities concerning commodity k. We call
such an equilibrium a generalized Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity k.
Corollary 4.9. For any k∈In, there exists a generalized Drèze equilibrium with respect to commodity k.
The corollary implies that if commodity k is the numeraire, there exists a QCE at which there are no binding expected
trade opportunities concerning the numeraire.
The connected set C also contains a point q− satisfying maxjrj(q−) = 0. This element of C induces a QCE where for at least
one commodity there are no binding expected trade opportunities and for all other commodities there may only be binding
expected supply opportunities and therefore is a generalized supply-constrained equilibrium. Similarly, there exists a QCE
at which consumers may only face binding expected demand opportunities and for at least one commodity there are no
binding expected trade opportunities, and is therefore what we call a generalized demand-constrained equilibrium. Such an
equilibrium is induced by a point q+ in C for which minjrj(q+) = 0. Notice that both types of equilibria are QCEs for which
there are no binding expected trade opportunities concerning at least one commodity, but ex ante it cannot be said which
commodity.
Corollary 4.10. There exists a generalized supply-constrained equilibrium and there exists a generalized demand-constrained
equilibrium.
Since we have not made any differentiability assumptions, we cannot say more about the structure of the set of equilibria
than the statement in Theorem 4.2 that there is a continuum connecting two extreme equilibria, i.e. loosely speaking the
dimension of the set of equilibria is at least one. We argue next that in general one should expect the dimension to be exactly
one. We can parametrize prices and the rationing vector r by means of an n-dimensional vector q. Using Lemma 4.6,w e
can show that the set of equilibria corresponds to the set of q’s solving z(q) = 0n. The system z(q) = 0n consists of n − 1
independent equations by virtue of Walras’ law as stated in Lemma 4.5. This leaves one degree of freedom, resulting in a
one-dimensional set of equilibria.








kwk = v for the same v. In case minw · P<maxw · P and we take some v,minw · P<v<maxw · P, there is one




5. Applications and extensions
5.1. Price indexation
In this subsection we apply the concept of QCE as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 3.1 to the set of admissible prices given by
P ={ p∈Rn
+|p
j ≤ pj ≤ ¯ pj,j∈I, j(pI) ≤ pj ≤ ¯  j(pI),j∈J}, (1)
where I and J partition In. This set satisﬁes the so-called noncircularity condition of Weddepohl (1987), saying that the prices
may not be indexed directly or indirectly by themselves. Dehez and Drèze (1984) and van der Laan (1984) have considered
special cases of this set by making additional assumptions on the upper and lower bound of the index commodities or on
the index functions, see also Chetty and Nayak (1978), Kurz (1982) and Weddepohl (1987). Here we only make some weak
assumptions by assuming that for any j∈I it holds that 0 <p
j ≤ ¯ pj < ∞ and that for any j∈J, the lower bound function  j
is convex, the upper bound function ¯  j is concave, and that for all feasible pI it holds that 0 <  j(pI) ≤ ¯  j(pI) < ∞, so that P
satisﬁes Assumption P. To give a characterization of a QCE, for simplicity we assume that all index functions are continuously
differentiable.
Suppose q∈Q induces a QCE and thus z(q) = 0n. Since r(q)∈G(p(q)), we have that p(q) · r(q) = maxp∈Pp · r(q). From the
ﬁrst-order Kuhn–Tucker conditions it then follows that there exists nonnegative numbers  j and ¯  j,j∈In, such that










∂ ¯  h(pI(q))
∂pj
,j∈I, (2)
rj(q) = ¯  j −  j,j∈J, (3)
and
 j(pj(q) − p
j) = 0, ¯  j(¯ pj − pj(q)) = 0,  j ¯  j = 0,j∈I, (4)
 j(pj(q) −  j(pI(q))) = 0, ¯  j(¯  j(pI(q)) − pj(q)) = 0,  j ¯  j = 0,j∈J. (5)
Recall that in a QCE Condition (iii) of Deﬁnition 3.2 is satisﬁed, but not necessarily Condition (iv) of Deﬁnition 2.1. So,
when there are binding expected supply (demand) opportunities concerning a commodity, its price is not necessarily on its
lower (upper) bound. To make this more precise, take an indexed commodity j∈J.F r o m(3) and the last complementarity
condition in (5) it follows that
 j =− rj(q) > 0i f rj(q) < 0, and ¯  j = rj(q) > 0i f rj(q) > 0.
From the ﬁrst two complementarity conditions in (5) it then follows that pj(q) =  j(pI(q)) if there are binding expected
supply opportunities for commodity j∈J and that pj(q) = ¯  j(pI(q)) if there are binding demand opportunities for commodity
j∈J, i.e. in case of binding expected supply (demand) opportunities the price of an indexed commodity is on its lower (upper)
bound given the prices pI(q) of the index commodities. For an index commodity j∈I, in general such a clear link does not
exist. For instance, suppose that all index functions are monotonically increasing in pI and all the derivatives are positive.
Now, if pk(q) < ¯  k(pI(q)) for all k∈J, then ¯  k = 0 for all k∈J and it follows from Eq. (2) that for all j∈I it holds







If also pk(q) >  k(pI(q)) for all k∈J, then  k = 0 for all k∈J and thus rj(q) = ¯  j −  j for all j∈I, implying that there can
only be binding expected trade opportunities for an index commodity j∈I when its price is on its upper or lower bound.
However, when the price of some indexed commodity is on its lower bound, then
 
k∈J k(∂ k(pI(q))/∂pj) is positive and
thus rj(q) may be positive even if ¯  j = 0 and thus pj(q) is not on its upper bound. In such a situation binding expected demand
opportunities of an index commodity may occur, not because its price is on its upper bound, but caused by the fact that the
prices of the indexed commodities cannot be decreased further. Similarly, if the price of some indexed commodity is on its
upper bound, there may be binding expected supply opportunities on index commodities, even when the prices of these
index commodities are not on their lower bounds.
Corollary 5.1. Let P be given as in (1) and let q∈Q be such that z(q) = 0n. Then, for all j∈J,
pj(q) =  j(pI(q)) ifrj(q) < 0 and pj(q) = ¯  j(pI(q)) ifrj(q) > 0.34 P.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37
When all index functions are monotonically increasing, then, for all j∈I,
pj(q) = p
j if rj(q) < 0 and for all k∈J,pk(q) < ¯  k(pI(q)),
and
pj(q) = ¯ pj if rj(q) > 0 and for all k∈J,pk(q) >  k(pI(q)).
Moreover, for j∈I,
pj(q) >p
j and rj(q) < 0 implies that pk(q) = ¯  k(pI(q)),for at least one k∈J,
and
pj(q) < ¯ pj and rj(q) > 0 implies that pk(q) =  k(pI(q)),for at least one k∈J.
Corollary5.1characterizesaQCEincasethesetPofadmissiblepricesisgivenasin(1)andgeneralizesthereforetheresults
obtained in the literature before. In particular, for every k∈In, there exists a generalized Drèze equilibrium with respect to
commodity k and there exists both a generalized supply-constrained and a generalized demand-constrained equilibrium.
5.2. Unbounded sets of admissible prices
In this subsection we consider an extension allowing that the set of admissible prices is unbounded. We show that
there is an unbounded connected set of QCEs with at least one of the prices going to inﬁnity. Let P be a convex, closed and
unbounded set of admissible prices in the interior of Rn
+ and deﬁne Q ={ q∈Rn| q − p 2 ≤ 1, for somep∈P}. Notice that the
set Q0 as deﬁned before is non-empty, while the set Q1 is empty. The next theorem says that there exists an unbounded
connectedsetofzeropointsofzinQcontainingapointinQ0.Again,azeropointofzinQ0 inducesafullysupply-constrained
no-trade equilibrium.
Theorem 5.2. Let E = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U and W, and let P be a non-empty, convex,
closed, unbounded set in the interior of Rn
+. Then there exists an unbounded connected subset C of Q such that C ∩ Q0 / =∅and each
point in C is a zero point of the reduced excess demand function z.
Proof. Let  0 =
 n
k=1wkqk for any q∈Q0, and for  >  0 deﬁne
P( ) ={ p∈P|
n  
k=1
wkpk ≤  },
Q( ) ={ q∈Q|
n  
k=1
wkqk ≤  },
¯ Q( ) ={ q∈Q|
n  
k=1
wkqk =  }.
For q∈Q, the vectors p(q),r(q) and z(q) are deﬁned as before. Let ¯   be a number satisfying ¯  > +  w 2. Then the set of
prices P(¯  ) satisﬁes the assumptions of Theorem 4.8.L e tQ¯  ,Q0
¯   and Q1
¯   be the corresponding sets (i.e. as the sets Q, Q0 and
Q1 corresponding to P deﬁned in Section 4) and let p¯  ,r¯   and z¯   be the corresponding functions on Q¯   (i.e. as the functions
p, r and z deﬁned on Q in Section 4). Applying Theorem 4.8 there is a connected set C¯   of zero points in Q¯   that intersects Q0
¯  
and Q1
¯  . Clearly, C¯   ∩ Q( ) contains a connected subset C( ) that intersects Q0
¯   and ¯ Q( ). Since ¯  > +  w 2, we have that
Q( ) = Q¯   ∩ Q( ) and that the restrictions of the functions p,r and z to Q( ) coincide with the restrictions of the functions
p¯  ,r¯   and z¯   to Q¯   ∩ Q( ). The set C( ) is therefore a connected set of zero points of the function z in Q( ) containing a point
in Q0 and a point in ¯ Q( ). Finally, take C = Q0 ∪ (∪ > 0C( )). Since any point in Q0 is a zero point of z, it follows that the set
C is an unbounded connected set of zero points of z in Q such that C ∩ Q0 / =∅ . 






j ≤ pj ≤ ¯ pj,j∈I ∪ J}, (6)
whereM,IandJformapartitionofIn.2 ThesetMisreferredtoasthesetofnumerairecommodities.ForM =∅andp
j = 0, ¯ pj =
∞forj∈I,thissethasbeenconsideredbyvanderLaan(1984)asaspecialcaseofthesetgiveninformula(1).Hereweassume
2 For simplicity we take prices bounded away from zero. The analysis can be extended to ε = 0 by generalizing the concept of constrained equilibrium to
quasi-constrained equilibrium as has been discussed in Kurz (1982).P.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37 35
that for any j∈I ∪ J it holds that 0 <p
j ≤ ¯ pj < ∞ and
 
j∈Ip
j < 1 <
 
j∈I ¯ pj. Without loss of generality, we may assume that
I ={ 1,...,|I|} and wj+1 ≥ wj,j = 1,...|I|−1. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict ourselves to the generic case















j=j  ¯ pj > 1.
Suppose q∈Q induces a QCE and thus z(q) = 0n. Again, r(q)∈G(p(q)) implies p(q) · r(q) = maxp∈Pp · r(q). From the
ﬁrst-order Kuhn–Tucker conditions it then follows that there exist nonnegative numbers  j,j∈M, nonnegative numbers
 j, ¯  j,j∈I ∪ J, and a number  I such that
rj(q) =−  j,j∈M, (7)
rj(q) =  I −  j + ¯  j,j∈I, (8)
rj(q) =−  j + ¯  j,j∈J, (9)
and furthermore the following complementarity conditions hold
 j(pj(q) − ε) = 0,j∈M, (10)
 j(pj(q) − p
j) = 0, ¯  j(¯ pj − pj(q)) = 0,  j ¯  j = 0,j∈I ∪ J. (11)
At a fully supply-constrained no-trade equilibrium we have that r(q) =− w, so that  j = wj and hence pj(q) = ε for all
j∈M, j = wj, ¯  j = 0 and hence pj(q) = p
j for all j∈J, while for j∈I it holds
 I −  j + ¯  j =− wj.
We claim that  I =− wj . For all j = 1,...,j   − 1 it holds that  j = 0 and ¯  j = wj  − wj ≥ 0,  j  = ¯  j  = 0, and for all j =
j  + 1,...,|I|itholdsthat ¯  j = 0and j = wj − wj  ≥ 0.Itthenfollowsimmediatelythatpricesofcommoditiesj = 1,...,j   − 1
satisfy pj = ¯ pj, and prices of commodities j = j  + 1,...,|I| satisfy pj = p
j. Intuitively, from the properties that p(q) · r(q) =
maxp∈Pp · r(q),r(q) =− w and
 
j∈Ipj = 1, it follows that the prices of the commodities with the larger total endowments
are set on their minimum level, and the prices of commodities with the smaller total endowments on their maximum level.
Toformallyshowourclaim,consideracommodityk∈{1,...,|I|} = I suchthatp
k <p k(q) < ¯ pk.Suchacommoditykexists,





j∈I2 ¯ pj = 1. It follows immediately that
 k = ¯  k = 0, so  I =− wk. Consider any commodity j∈{1,...,k− 1}. Then it follows from Eq. (8) that  j − ¯  j =  I − rj(q) =
 I + wj =− wk + wj ≤ 0,sothat j = 0and ¯  j = wk − wj ≥ 0.Similarly,foranycommodityj∈{k + 1,...,|I|}itfollowsfromEq.
(8) that  j − ¯  j =− wk + wj ≥ 0, so that ¯  j = 0 and  j =− wk + wj ≥ 0. Together with the complementarity properties given
in (11) it follows that
k−1  
j=1


























sok = j .Summarizing,atafullysupply-constrainedequilibrium,thepricesofallthenumeraireandindexedcommoditiesare
onitslowerbound,whilethepriceofpreciselyoneindexcommodityisnotboundedandthepricesoftheindexcommodities
with larger total endowments are set on their minimum level, and the prices of the index commodities with smaller total
endowments on their maximum level.
From Eqs. (7)–(11) it follows that at any QCE it holds that there may be binding expected supply opportunities for a
numeraire commodity, which only occurs when its price is ε, while there can only be binding expected supply (demand)
opportunities for an indexed commodity when its price is on its lower (upper) bound. For an index commodity j∈I binding
expected opportunities can also occur when its price is not binding, due to the restriction that the sum of the prices of the
index commodities is equal to one. For all commodities j∈I with non-binding prices we have that rj(q) =  I. Therefore, for
all these commodities there are either no binding expected trade opportunities ( I = 0), or the same amount of expected
trade opportunities on either their demands ( I > 0) or their supplies ( I < 0). At a QCE induced by a point q satisfying  
j∈Iqj = 1, it holds that  I = 0 and there can only be binding expected supply (demand) opportunities for a commodity in36 P.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37
I if its price is on its lower (upper) bound. This conﬁrms the results in van der Laan (1984) for the case that M =∅ . When
M / =∅ , the following result can also be obtained.
Theorem5.3. LetE = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,P)beaneconomysatisfyingAssumptionsX,UandW,andletthesetPbeasspeciﬁedin(6).
Then there exists ¯  >  0 such that for all zero points q∈Q of z with
 n
k=1wkqk ≥ ¯   it holds that rj(q) = wj for all j∈I ∪ J,pj(q) >ε
and rj(q) = 0 for all j∈M.
Proof. From Theorem 5.2 it follows that there exists a sequence (qt)t ∈N in Q, satisfying
 n
h=1whqt
h ≥ t and z(qt) = 0n for all
t ∈ IN.SincePandthusalsoQisboundedinanyj∈I ∪ J,withoutlossofgeneralityitfollowsthatqt
k →∞andthereforept
k(q) →
∞ for some k∈M. It is obvious that for this k it holds that rk(qt) = 0. Now, deﬁne It ={ j∈I|rj(qt) <w j},Jt ={ j∈J|rj(qt) <w j}
and Mt ={ j∈M|pj(qt) = ε}. Then, for any j∈I ∪ J ∪ Mt we have that pj(qt)/pk(qt) goes to zero. Moreover, for all i∈Im and j∈In,
the demand di
j(qt) is bounded from above by wi
j + (wj − rj(qt)), while rk(qt) = 0 implies net supply equal to −wk is possible
for commodity k.F o rt sufﬁciently large, for any i∈Im, and for any j∈It ∪ Jt ∪ Mt, it follows from the monotonicity of the
preferences that di
j(qt) = wi
j + (wj − rj(qt)) >w i
j, contradicting z(qt) = 0n. Hence It ∪ Jt ∪ Mt =∅ . So, for t sufﬁciently large it
follows that rj(qt) = wj for all j∈I ∪ J, and pj(qt) >εand rj(qt) = 0 for all j∈M. 
The theorem implies that there exists a connected set of QCEs containing a fully supply-constrained equilibrium and an
equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning the demand of the commodities in I ∪ J and no binding
expectedtradeopportunitiesatallonthecommoditiesinMwithpricesaboveε.Clearly,atthelatterequilibriumitmusthold
that for every consumer the consumption of the commodities in I ∪ J is equal to its initial endowments of these commodities.
HencethepricesofthecommoditiesinMareWalrasianequilibriumpricesforareducedeconomywithonlycommoditiesinM
and preferences on this reduced commodity space obtained from the preferences in E with consumption of the commodities
in I ∪ J equal to the initial endowments. At any q0 inducing a trivial equilibrium we have that r(q0) =− w, while at any ¯ q
inducing an equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning demand opportunities of commodities in I ∪ J
and Walrasian prices for the commodities in M, it holds that rj(¯ q) = wj for all j∈I ∪ J, and rj(¯ q) = 0 for all j∈M. Observe that












pj(q0) =−  0 
j∈I
wj + 1 < 1












pj(¯ q) = ¯  
 
j∈I
wj + 1 > 1.
From this we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4. Let E = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,P) be an economy satisfying Assumptions X, U and W, and let the set P be as speciﬁed in
(6). Then there exists a connected set of QCEs, containing a fully supply-constrained no-trade equilibrium and the following types
of equilibria:
(i) For any j∈I ∪ J, an equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying rj(q) = 0, i.e. a generalized Drèze equilibrium with respect to
commodity j∈I ∪ J;
(ii) An equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying rj(q) = 0 for all j∈M, i.e. a generalized Drèze equilibrium without binding
expected trade opportunities for commodities in M;
(iii) An equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying maxj∈Inrj(q) = 0, i.e. a supply-constrained equilibrium, so without binding
expected opportunities for at least one of the commodities;
(iv) An equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying maxj∈I∪Jrj(q) = 0, i.e. a supply-constrained equilibrium without binding
expected trade opportunities for at least one of the commodities in I ∪ J;
(v) An equilibrium induced by a point q satisfying
 
j∈Iqj = 1, i.e. for a commodity in I there may only be binding expected supply
(demand) opportunities if its price is on its lower (upper) bound;
(vi) An equilibrium with completely pessimistic expectations concerning the demands of the commodities in I ∪ J and Walrasian
prices for the reduced economy with commodities in M.
At an equilibrium of type (iv) it may hold for some j∈M that rj(q) < 0 and hence there are binding expected supply
opportunities for some of the commodities in M. At such an equilibrium we have that for some h∈I ∪ J,rh(q) = 0 and ph(q) ≥
p
h > 0andthusph(q)(−wh − rh(q)) < 0.Now,supposethatrj(q) < 0andthuspj(q) = εforsomej∈M.Fromthemonotonicity
of the preferences it then follows for sufﬁciently small ε that di
j(q) = wi
j + (wj − rj(q)) >w i
j for all i∈Im, contradicting that
zj(q) = 0. Hence we must have that rj(q) = 0 for all j∈M, implying that there are no binding expected trade opportunities for
all commodities in M.
Corollary5.5. LetE = ({Xi,i,wi}
m
i=1,P)beaneconomysatisfyingAssumptionsX,UandW,andletthesetPbeasspeciﬁedin(6).
Then for ε sufﬁciently close to zero, there exists a supply-constrained equilibrium without binding expected trade opportunitiesP.J.-J. Herings et al. / Journal of Mathematical Economics 45 (2009) 23–37 37
for all commodities in M and at least one of the commodities in I ∪ J. Further, if I ∪ J =∅ , then the equilibrium of type (vi) is a
Walrasian equilibrium for the economy E with price set P ={ p∈Rn
+|pj ≥ ε,j∈In}. In this case there is a connected set of equilibria
connecting a fully supply-constrained no-trade equilibrium with a Walrasian equilibrium.
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